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One of the fundamental problems in both economics and organization is to un-
derstand how individuals coordinate. The widely used minimum-eort coordination
game has been used as a simplied model to better understand this problem. This
paper rst presents some theoretical results that give conditions under which the
minimum-eort coordination game exhibits hysteresis. Using these theoretical re-
sults, some experimental hypotheses are developed and then conrmed using human
subjects in the laboratory. The main insight is that play in a given game is heavily
dependent on the history of parameters leading up to that game. For example,
the experiments show when cost c = 0:5 in the minimum-eort coordination game,
there is signicantly more high eort if the cost has increased to c = 0:5 compared
to when the cost has decreased to c = 0:5. One implication of this is that a tem-
porary change in parameters may be able move the economic system from a bad
equilibrium to a good equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
One common cause of sub-optimal economic outcomes is the inability of individuals to coordinate
their actions. For example, there are many situations where individuals could mutually benet
if they were able to coordinate their actions, but the environment makes coordination dicult.
When faced with these situations, it is important to understand what aspects of the environment
make coordination dicult, and try to determine what can be done to help individuals attain
better outcomes. This paper focuses on hysteresis, or path dependence, and the eect it has on
equilibrium selection in coordination games. The paper starts with a simple model, and develops
theoretical results describing conditions under which hysteresis occurs in coordination games. Us-
ing the theoretical results, some experimental hypotheses are formulated, and are then conrmed
using laboratory experiments with the minimum-eort coordination game. These results suggest
that temporary changes in the environment can lead to a signicant increase in the amount of
coordination.
A system is said to exhibit hysteresis if there is path dependence. For example, in the con-
text of a minimum-eort coordination game with cost parameter c, the system is said to exhibit
hysteresis if the level of eort is signicantly dierent at c = 0:5 depending on whether the cost
has increased to c = 0:5 or decreased to c = 0:5. To better understand this hysteresis, this pa-
per looks at a theoretical model of the minimum-eort coordination, and nds conditions under
which this phenomena is likely to occur. In particular, this paper focuses on s-shaped equilibrium
correspondences, because these correspondences lead to hysteresis (further details in Section 2).
Using the theoretical results from this model, some experimental hypotheses are developed
and then tested. The experiments involve subjects playing the minimum-eort coordination game
repeatedly as the cost is varied. There are two treatments, one in which the cost is varied from low
to high to low, and another where it is varied form high to low to high. Varying the cost in this
organized manner provides a test for determining whether hysteresis occurs in the minimum-eort
coordination game. The experiments provide strong support for hysteresis in the minimum-eort
coordination game showing large dierences in eort levels at c = 0:5 depending on whether cost
has increased or decreased to c = 0:5. Specically, groups chose high eort 85% of the time when
c started low and increased to 0:5 compared to 13% of the time when c started high and decreasedSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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to 0:5. Another important implication of hysteresis supported by the experimental results is that a
temporary decrease in the cost parameter may move the system from a bad equilibrium to a good
equilibrium. In the experiments, 13% of groups played the high eort at c = 0:5, but after the cost
was temporarily decreased and then changed back to c = 0:5, the level of groups playing high eort
increased signicantly to 69%. These results highlight the implications of hysteresis on equilibrium
selection.
One approach to better understanding the equilibrium selection problem is to impose additional
equilibrium criteria, which renes the set of equilibria and makes predictions more clear. In their
seminal work, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) suggest two dierent methods for selecting equilibria in
games with multiple equilibria: \payo dominance" and \risk dominance". In certain situations,
these two selection criteria may conict, meaning the payo dominant equilibrium is not the risk
dominant equilibrium. When there is conict, Harsanyi and Selten (1988) suggest that payo
dominance should be used instead of risk dominance. Since this however, a growing amount of
support for the risk dominant equilibrium has emerged (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young,
1993; Carlsson and Damme, 1993). Rather than suggesting that one equilibrium is played in a
specic environment, this paper shows that there is hysteresis in coordination games, which means
that dierent equilibria may be selected in a single environment depending on the history.
Another approach to better understanding the equilibrium selection problem is to run experi-
ments with human subjects in the laboratory. The game commonly used to model these situations
in the laboratory is the minimum-eort coordination game (or weak-link game). Experimental
results suggest that coordination is more dicult with larger groups and higher costs of eort
(Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross, 1990; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1990; Goeree and Holt,
2005). Building on these results, others have examined how changes in the environment can lead
to higher levels of coordination. Some examples include adding communication (Cooper, DeJong,
Forsythe, and Ross, 1992), competition between groups (Myung, 2011), and entrance fees (Cachon
and Camerer, 1996). The results in this paper suggest that since there is hysteresis, changes in the
environment only need to be temporary to result in an increase in the amount of coordination.
Systems exhibiting hysteresis are by no means rare. It is present in a wide variety of physical
settings including magnetism and elasticity, but has also been observed in economics. Blanchard
and Summers (1986) present a model in which the natural unemployment rate exhibits hysteresisSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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in the presence of shocks. Employers make employment decisions in advance with the goal of
maintaining steady employment in expectation. Employment shocks change these expectations
and lead to more permanent changes in the natural unemployment rate. Baldwin (1988) shows
that overvaluation of the dollar leads to hysteresis in United States import prices. Dixit (1989)
examines entry of Japanese rms into the US market based on exchange rate uctuations and nds
that due to sunk costs, rm may remain in US even after the favorable exchange rate uctuation
has subsided. Nyberg (1997) examines an evolutionary model of honesty, and nds that once a
society loses its honesty, hysteresis makes it dicult to reestablish. Finally, G ocke (2002) has a
more detailed survey on some of the work that has been done examining hysteresis in economics.
This paper focuses on coordination games, and nds that hysteresis occurs in these settings as well.
There have been some experimental papers that provide evidence of this type of hysteresis in
coordination games. Weber (2006) examines the eect of changing group sizes on the group's ability
to coordinate in a minimum-eort coordination game. He nds that coordination in large groups
is possible if the group starts with a small number of subjects, and gradually increases to a size of
12 subjects per group. This is in contrast to groups that start with 12 subjects per group, which
are never able to coordinate on high-eort levels. This suggests that there is hysteresis based on
the group size, because the selected equilibrium for group size 12 depends on the history leading up
to that game. Brandts and Cooper (2006) examine the eect of using payo bonuses as a means
of inducing cooperation in the minimum-eort coordination game. They nd that adding bonuses
helps bring groups from low eort levels to higher eort levels. In addition, they nd that when the
payos are decreased back to initial levels after the temporary bonuses, eort levels are higher than
before the bonuses. This dependence on the history of the game is the type of behavior studied in
this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives some intuition for the model, and what
would cause hysteresis. Section 3 introduces the model. Next, Section 4 gives the theoretical results
and experimental hypotheses. Section 5 presents the experimental design and the experimental
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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2 Hysteresis Intuition
The main focus of this paper is determining when hysteresis occurs, and examining the implications.
This section provides a brief example to give an idea of what an equilibrium correspondence with
hysteresis looks like, and some of the implications. The example equilibrium correspondence is the
s-shaped equilibrium correspondence displayed in Figure 1. This type of correspondence is referred
to as double saddle-node bifurcation.1 A double saddle-node is a bifurcation such that there is a
unique solution in the limit of each direction, but three solutions inside some region in the middle
as displayed in Figure 1.
If solutions tend to stay on the solution path (they do not jump between the equilibrium
solutions as a parameter is perturbed), then the double saddle-node bifurcations leads to hysteresis.
For example, consider the double saddle-node bifurcation in Figure 1. In this example, suppose
that the parameter  varies rst from 0:2 to 0:8 (denoted by the red line), then it decreases from
0:8 back to 0:2 (denoted by the blue line). In this case, the system starts at  = 0:2, where
there is a unique equilibrium. As  increases, the system remains on the top part of the s-shaped
curve, until it reaches the saddle-node bifurcation at  = 0:58 at which point the high equilibrium
ceases to exist. For  > 0:58, there is a unique equilibrium so the system jumps from the high
equilibrium down to the low equilibrium (jump denoted by dotted line). The system remains in
the low equilibrium as  increases from 0:58 to 0:8. When  decreases from 0:8, it remains on the
low solution until  = 0:42, at which point the low equilibrium ceases to exist, and again there is
a unique equilibrium. This causes the system to jump back up from the low equilibrium to the
high equilibrium. Therefore, for intermediate values,  2 (0:42;0:58), the outcome depends on the
starting position. When starting with  = 0:2, the system goes to the equilibrium  = 0:94 at
 = 0:5. When starting with  = 0:8, the system goes to the equilibrium  = 0:058 at  = 0:5.
This hysteresis is caused by the s-shaped equilibrium correspondence, and the assumption that the
system traces along the equilibrium correspondence as the parameter changes.
Another implication of this double-saddle node bifurcation is that temporary changes in param-
eters may lead to large changes in outcomes. For example, consider the situation where  = 0:5
and the equilibrium chosen is  = 0:058. The system moves from the low  equilibrium to the high
1A saddle-node bifurcation point is the point on the equilibrium correspondence where the number of equilibria
is n to one side of the bifurcation point and n + 2 to the other side.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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Figure 1: Example of how double saddle-node bifurcation leads to hysteresis.
 equilibrium if  is temporarily decreased and then changed back to  = 0:5. This is true, because
when  is decreased to  = 0:2, the low  equilibrium ceases to exist, so the system automatically
goes to the high  equilibrium. However, since the solutions stay on path, when  is increased back
to  = 0:5, the system remains at the high  equilibrium. So a temporary change in the parameter
can move the system from one equilibrium to another.
The next section introduces the model, and then examines situations where hysteresis occurs.
3 Model








. A joint-action prole is denoted by s = fs1;:::;sng. Each player faces a
payo function ui (s;) that depends on the parameter  from parameter space  .
The set of mixed strategies is denoted by i = i, which is the set of probability distributions
over Si. A mixed strategy is denoted by i 2 i, which is a mapping from Si to i, where i (sj) is
the probability that player i plays pure-action sj, and  = 1 n is the set of mixed strategy
proles. A joint mixed-strategy prole is denoted  = f1;:::;ng. Player i's expected payo forSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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mixed-strategy prole  is ui (;) =
P
s2S1Sn p(s)ui(s;), where p(s) = i2Ii (si) is the
probability of the pure-strategy prole s give mixed strategy prole .
A joint strategy prole  is an equilibrium of the game g() if the equilibrium function f :
      ! R, dependent on parameter  2  satises f (;;) = 0. For example, f could be

















Given  and , any joint mixed-strategy prole  is an equilibrium if (1) is satised. The game g()
has multiple equilibria for parameter  if f (;;) = 0 for more than one joint mixed-strategy
prole . Let  (;) = fjf (;;) = 0g be the set of equilibria of game g() according to
equilibrium function f with parameter .
Denition 3.1 The equilibrium correspondence  (;) varies continuously from  to   starting
at  2   
;

if and only if for all " > 0, there exists some N 2 N such that for all k =
0;:::;N   1,
k+1   k =
    
N
) kk+1   kk < "
where 0 = ;N =   and k 2  (k;). The endpoint of this continuous path is   2  ( ;).
The equilibrium correspondence varies continuously if you can trace the correspondence between
the two parameter values while always moving in the direction from the rst parameter value
to the second parameter value. For example, in Figure 2, the equilibrium correspondence varies
continuously from 1 to 2 starting at 2. However, the equilibrium correspondence does not vary
continuously from 1 to 2 starting at 1.
Assumption #1: When faced with g(), players will play one of the equilibria, call this
 (g()) 2  (;).
Assumption #2: If game g() is played, and players play equilibrium  (g()), then when
game g (0) is played, if the equilibrium correspondence  (;) varies continuously from  to 0
starting at  (g()) with endpoint 0. Then when g (0) is played, players will play 0, that is
 (g (0)) = 0 2  (0;).2





Figure 2: Example of continuous variation of a correspondence between two parameter values.
Denition 3.2 (Hysteresis) The equilibrium correspondence  (;) exhibits hysteresis for equi-
librium function f with parameter  if there exists points 1;2;3 such that,
1. the correspondence varies continuously from 1 to 2 with starting point 1 2  (1;) and
endpoint 2 2  (2;),
2. the correspondence varies continuously from 3 to 2 with starting point 3 2  (3;) and
endpoint 0
2 2  (2;), and
3. 2 6= 0
2.
What types of games have this hysteresis property? The next section examines the minimum-
eort coordination game, and shows that it exhibits hysteresis.
3.1 Minimum-Eort Coordination Game
A minimum-eort coordination game consists of n players, I = f1;:::;ng. Each player has two
actions, they can either choose to exert high eort or low eort, Si = fxL;xHg for xL;xH 2 R and
xL < xH. The joint pure-action prole is denoted by s 2 fxL;xHg
n. Performing the high eort is
more costly than performing the low eort. The benet of the high eort is only received if every
minimum-eort game. This result suggests that there are behavioral spillover between games, which would provide
some support for Assumption #2.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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sj = xh
for all j 6= i
sj = xL










xH (1   c) xL   cxH
xL (1   c) xL (1   c)
Figure 3: Minimum-Eort Coordination Game.
player plays the high eort action. If any player chooses the low eort action, then all players only
receive the benet from the low action. This yields payos,
ui (s) = min
j=1;:::;n
sj   csi:
The normal form of the minimum-eort coordination game is displayed in Figure 3. For a given
value of cost, c 2 R, the minimum-eort coordination game is denoted by cg(c). The set of all
minimum-eort coordination games is CG = fcg(c)jc 2 Rg.
3.2 Nash Equilibria
If c > 1, then the cost of exerting high eort outweighs the benet, so action xL strictly dominates
xH for all players. Therefore all players playing xL is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when
c > 1. Similarly, if c < 0, then the cost is negative, so the action xH strictly dominates xL. So, all
players playing xH is the unique Nash equilibrium. When c 2 [0;1], the game has two pure strategy
Nash Equilibria: one where everyone plays the high eort xH, and one where everyone plays the
low eort xL. There is also one symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium where all players play xH
with probability c
1
N 1, which is clearly increasing in N for c 2 (0;1).
For all values of c 2 (0;1), the equilibrium where all players play xH with probability 1 isSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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the payo dominant equilibrium. For levels of c close to 1, the dierence between the high eort
equilibrium payo and the low eort equilibrium payo becomes small. However, there is a large
loss possible if the high eort action is played, while there is no loss possible if the low eort is
played. Therefore, when c is close to 1, the high eort action is risky.
3.3 Symmetric Quantal-Response Equilibria
This section studies properties of the symmetric quantal-response equilibria. Suppose that H is
the probability that a player plays the high eort action xH, and L = 1   H is the probability
that a player plays the low eort equilibrium. Using the logit quantal response function, a SQRE




N 1 c)]   H = 0: (2)
When  = 0, there is always a unique SQRE, H = 0:5. The intuition for this is that when
one player is playing randomly ( = 0), then it is the best response for the other players to play
randomly as well. Secondly, in the limit as  ! 1, there are always three solutions because the set
of SQRE approaches the set of Nash equilibria as  ! 1, and there are always three symmetric
Nash Equilibrium for games with c 2 (0;1). To sum up, for low  players are not very responsive
to payo, and so the only equilibrium is for everyone to play essentially randomly. However, when
 increases, then players are more sensitive to payos, and the set of equilibrium becomes closer to
the set of Nash equilibria. The next section examines the properties of the SQRE correspondence
as the cost parameter c is varied.
4 Results
This section determines properties of the logit SQRE correspondence for the minimum-eort coor-
dination game. The main result nds conditions that need to be satised in order to get an s-shaped
SQRE correspondence, which as has been shown leads to hysteresis. The results are summed up
in the following proposition,
Proposition 4.1 For every coordination game, g (c) 2 CG:September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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1. There exists a  such that the logit SQRE correspondence, (c;), exhibits hysteresis for








2. The critical value  is decreasing in N.












4. For N > 2, the saddle-node bifurcation points will not be symmetric around H = 1
2.
This proposition states that for any coordination game of the given form, if the players have
a high enough payo responsiveness (suciently high ), then the game should exhibit hysteresis.
This means that given a game and an equilibrium, it is possible to vary one parameter slightly and
then change it back, and the system could be at a completely dierent equilibrium. This can be
very important if one of the equilibria is more desirable than the other and all that is required is a
small perturbation of the system to go from the less desired to the more desired equilibrium. The
second point in the proposition says that this critical value is decreasing as the size of the group gets
larger. Assuming that the values of  for the individuals are not dependent on group size, then this
means that hystersis is more likely as the group size increases. The third part gives the analytical
solution for the values of the saddle-node bifurcations for the N = 2 case. It is not possible to
nd the analytical solution for the N > 2 case, but with numerical analysis, it is clear that the
c value of both saddle-nodes is decreasing as the group size gets larger (as shown in Figure 4).
Also, for group size larger than two, the double saddle-node bifurcation is not symmetric, meaning
that the bifurcation points are not equidistant from 0.5. However, in the N = 2 case, the double
saddle-node bifurcation is symmetric.
The proof of this is given in the appendix. The proof of this proposition involves analyzing
certain properties of the equilibrium correspondence. The double saddle-node bifurcation is not a
function, so it is dicult to analyze. However, it is possible to solve for the equilibrium value of c
as a function of H, c(H), which is a function and therefore easier to work with. The equilibriumSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
Page 11/26




















(a) N = 2 (b) N = 3




















(a) N = 5 (b) N = 10
Figure 4: QRE correspondences as c is varied for dierent value of N and  = 4.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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correspondence (c;) has a double saddle-node bifurcation if c(H) ! 1 as H ! 1, c(H) !
 1 as H ! 0, and c0 (H) < 0 for some value of H 2 (0;1). This process ensures existence of
a double saddle-node bifurcation for suciently large values of . The rest of the proposition is
obtained from comparative statics that are detailed in the appendix.
This setup yields some testable implications, the most important being that the equilibrium
correspondence of the minimum-eort coordination game exhibits hysteresis. To test this, it is
necessary to run an experiment with multiple games, where the games are varied in an organized
manner to determine whether the experimental outcomes exhibit hysteresis or not. Based on the
theoretical results, the experiment is used to test the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: In the minimum eort coordination game, there should be signicantly higher
eort levels at c = 0:5 in groups that start with a low cost that gradually increases to c = 0:5
than in groups that start with a high cost that gradually decreases to c = 0:5.
Hypothesis 2: If the cost is varied from low to high to low, then for an intermediate cost level
c, there should be signicantly higher eort levels the rst time the group faces c (going
from low to high) than the second time the group faces c (going from high to low).
Hypothesis 3: If the cost is varied from high to low to high, then for an intermediate cost level
c, there should be signicantly lower eort levels the rst time the group faces c (going
from high to low) than the second time the group faces c (going from low to high).
These hypotheses predict that there is hysteresis in the minimum-eort coordination games. The
next section details the experimental methods and results.
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental Design
The subjects were drawn from a pool of undergraduate students from Purdue University that were
signed up to participate in experiments at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory.
Upon entering the lab, the subjects were randomly assigned to a computer and given a handout
containing the instructions. After all subjects had been seated, the instructions were read aloud.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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After the instructions, each subject completed a quiz to make sure that they understood the format
of the game (see supplementary material for instructions and quiz). The experiment did not start
until all subjects had correctly answered all of the questions on the quiz. The experiment was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) (For a screenshot of
the experimental interface see supplementary material). During the experiments, all payos were
displayed in US dollars. Subjects' nal payo was the sum of earnings from 3 randomly selected
rounds. After the experiment, subjects were anonymously given their payment in cash. The average
payo was $12.50 and each session took about 45 minutes to complete including instructions.
The experiment was divided into six sessions, each of which consisted of 60 rounds. At the
beginning of the session, subjects were divided into groups of four, and remained in the same group
for all 60 rounds. In each round, the subjects played a minimum-eort coordination game in which
they were asked to choose one of two options, high eort (labeled X) or low eort (labeled Y ).
Based on the choices of all members of the group, if everyone chose high eort then the group
choice was high eort (labeled X), and if anyone chose low eort then the group choice was low
eort (labeled Y ). Their payos were displayed in a table similar to that in Figure 3, with xH = 6,
xL = 1:5, and varying cost parameters c 2 [ 0:05;1:05]. In the table, all payos were multiplied
out, so the subjects just saw a single number in each box. After all subjects had made their choice
they got to see their payo for the round, and their group choice.3 The players also were asked to
record their choices and payos from each round on a record sheet.
The experiment consisted of two types of sessions. One in which cost was varied from low to
high to low (LHL), and another where cost was varied from high to low to high (HLH). LHL and
HLH each had a total of 64 subjects divided into 16 groups. In the LHL sessions, the cost started
at c =  0:05, gradually increased to c = 1:05, and then decreased back to c =  0:05. In the HLH
sessions, the cost started at c = 1:05, gradually decreased to c =  0:05, and then increased back
to c = 1:05. Figure 5 shows the full progression of the costs for each type of session.
5.2 Experimental Results
Table 1 displays eort rates at c = 0:5 for the dierent directions (whether cost is increasing to
c = 0:5 or decreasing to c = 0:5) for both the LHL and HLH sessions.




























(a) LHL Sessions (b) HLH Sessions
Figure 5: Progression of costs in LHL and HLH sessions.
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be signicantly more high-eort at c = 0:5 in groups that
started at a low cost and gradually increased to c = 0:5 than in groups that started at a high
cost and gradually decreased to c = 0:5. In other words, dierent groups have dierent outcomes
depending on the starting point. In LHL, the groups started with a cost of c =  0:05 and then cost
gradually increased until it reached c = 0:5 in rounds 16-18. In HLH, the groups started with a
cost of c = 1:05 and then cost gradually decreased until it reached c = 0:5 in rounds 19-21. Table 1
shows that when players start with a low cost, 88% (169/192) of individuals play high eort, which
leads to 85% (41/48) of groups attaining the high eort when c = 0:5 in rounds 16-18 of the LHL
treatment. Alternatively when players start with a high cost, only 35% (67/197) of individuals play
high eort, which leads to 13% (6/48) of groups attaining the high eort when c = 0:5 in rounds
19-21 of the HLH treatment. So when the group started at a low cost, and increased to c = 0:5,
they attained the high eort 85% as compared to only 13% when the group started at a high cost
and decreased to c = 0:5. This dierence is signicant using a one-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-Sum TestSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
Page 15/26
Table 1: Rates of high eort of individuals and groups for each session.
Session Rounds Direction Cost % Indv. = High % Group = High
LHL
16-18 Increasing 0.5 88% (169/192) 85% (41/48)
45-47 Decreasing 0.5 71% (136/192) 56% (27/48)
HLH
19-21 Decreasing 0.5 35% (67/192) 13% (6/48))
45-47 Increasing 0.5 72% (138/192) 69% (33/48)
with normal approximation (p = 8:5  10 5).4 This provides strong support for hypothesis 1, and
suggests that there is hysteresis in the minimum-eort coordination game.
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2
While Hypothesis 1 predicted that dierent groups will have dierent outcomes at c = 0:5 depending
on the starting point, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 go even further by predicting that the same
group has dierent outcomes at c = 0:5 depending on whether the cost is increasing or decreasing.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that in LHL, there would be signicantly more high-eort when the subjects
play the minimum-eort coordination game at c = 0:5 when the cost is changing from low to high
than when the cost in going from high to low. In LHL the cost starts at c =  0:05 and gradually
increases to c = 0:5 in rounds 16-18. Then the cost increases more to c = 1:05 before it starts to
decrease again, and reaches c = 0:5 again in rounds 45-47. Table 1 shows details of the level of
high eort at the individual and group level in the LHL sessions. As Hypothesis 2 predicted, a
one-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test with normal approximation (p = 0:045) conrms that there is
signicantly more high eort when the cost is increasing than when it is decreasing at c = 0:5.
Figure 6 shows the full progression of the level of high eort for both individuals and groups.
Figure 6(a) shows the individual choices. One striking observation from this plot is that when the
cost was c = 0:99, 66% (42/64) of subjects played high eort in the game. In this game, subjects
could guarantee a payo of $0.02 by playing low eort. If the subjects played high eort then they
4To test the signigance of the dierence in eorts between the two sets of groups, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test
is used. Each group plays at c = 0:5 for three periods, and receives a score of 0-3 depending on how many times
they attained the high eort in those three periods. Rank-sums are then determined for these sets, and a normal
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(b) High Eort Groups
Rounds 1-31 (Low to High)
Rounds 32-60 (High to Low)
Figure 6: Progression of high eort in LHL for individuals and groups.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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would get $0.06 if everyone else played high eort and -$4.44 if one other person choose low eort.
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted that in HLH, subjects would exert signicantly less high eort the rst
time they play at c = 0:5 (as cost is decreasing) compared to the second time they play at c = 0:5
(as cost is increasing). Table 1 shows that 13% of groups attain the high eort as the cost is
decreasing while 69% attain the high eort as the cost is increasing. The dierence in levels of high
eort groups is signicant using a one-tailed Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test with normal approximation
(p = 1:6  10 3). This shows that a temporary decrease in the cost can have a large impact on
equilibrium selection. This temporary decrease in the cost helped increase the percentage of high
eort groups from 13% to 69%. These results strongly support Hypotheses 3. Figure 7 shows the
full progression of both group and individual choices in the HLH sessions.
6 Conclusion
This paper started with the idea that hysteresis, a property that is common in wide range of
physical settings, is also present in an economic system. Proposition 4.1 shows that the minimum-
eort coordination game exhibits hysteresis as long as several assumptions are satised. Based on
this theoretical result, some experimental hypotheses were developed and then tested in the lab
using human subjects. The experimental results presented in Section 5 provide support for the
theoretical results, suggesting that hysteresis occurs in the minimum-eort coordination game.
Probably the most important implication of this hysteresis is on equilibrium selection. The
experimental results showed that in a minimum-eort coordination game with cost c = 0:5, 13% of
groups played high eort when the cost was decreasing, as opposed to 72% of groups when the cost
was increasing. This suggests that the same group of people can behave one way in a certain game,
but then behave completely dierently in the same game after a parameter has been temporarily
changed. With regard to equilibrium selection, the suggests that we may be able to move from one
equilibrium to a better equilibrium by just temporarily changing certain parameters.
Another interesting implication of the s-shaped curve that was not studied in this paper is the















Probability of Playing High - All Groups





















Probability of Group Choice being High - All Groups







(b) High Eort Groups
Rounds 1-31 (Low to High)
Rounds 32-60 (High to Low)
Figure 7: Progression of high eort in HLH for individuals and groups.September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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the cost was changed exogenously. However, in many situations, the parameters may be changing
endogenously. For example, if coordination on the high eort pushes the cost upward while the
groups that exert low eort have decreasing costs, then this would lead to a cycle. The eect of
this cycling on equilibrium selection provides some interesting questions for future work.
Given the implications of this hysteresis it is important as determine how likely this hysteresis
is in a framework more general the minimum-eort coordination game. Though this topic is not
discussed in this paper, it is hypothesized that the s-shaped curve is not a knife-edge case, but is
likely to occur in a large number of settings as well. Better understanding when this s-shaped curve
occurs may help provide better understanding of the equilibrium selection process in more general
settings. Further examination of the genericity of this hysteresis is saved for future work.
Finally, the model presented in this paper is quite simple, and does not factor in a lot of things
that are likely going on as the parameters change in these games. However, even this simple model
is able to provide clean predictions about what we see in the experimental lab, so for this paper
it is sucient. Another interesting avenue for future work would be to try to develop a more
sophisticated model of learning in close games, and see if this provides any additional insights
about phenomena studied in this paper.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1: First, calculate the symmetric quantal response equilibrium of the
game. Suppose that all players play xH with probability H and xL with probability L. So the
probabilities are,
P (All others play H) = N 1
H , and
P (At least one other L) = 1   N 1
H :
The payos are as follows,
ui (xL; i) = (1   c)xL
ui (xH; i) = xL(1   N 1
H ) + xHN 1
H   cxH
= xL   cxH + N 1
H (xH   xL):September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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In order to show that hysteresis is possible, it is necessary to show that the bifurcation corre-
spondence, (c;), has the double saddle-node bifurcation. To do this, we nd c (H), which is
a function. Next, show that limH!0 c(H) !  1, limH!1 c(H) ! 1, and c0(H) < 0 for
some H 2 (0;1). If these conditions hold then, the bifurcation correspondence, (c;), has a




































(H) > 0 ()  >
1
(N   1)p(1   p)
N 1 (xH   xL)
:
In order to get the s-shaped curve, this needs to hold for some H 2 (0;1). Since the right side ofSeptember 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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the above equation is minimized when H = 1=N, so see that,
1
(N   1)H (1   H)























then for all   , the bifurcation correspondence  (c;)(c) has the desired s-shaped form.









for all N  2:
This holds by the Bernoulli Inequality5. Therefore,  is decreasing in N. This means that as the
group size increases, holding everything else constant, the s-shaped curve is more likely.
Finally for any xed value of , the saddle-node bifurcation points of the s-shaped curve are at








(xH   xL)(N   1)
= 0: (6)
5The Bernoulli Inequality says that for 1   > 0 and    1,
(1 + )
  1 + :
Set  = N=N+1 and  =  
1
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An explicit solution for this equation in not tractable unless N = 2. In the N = 2 case, solving
this gives the solution
H =
(xH   xL) 
q
2 (xH   xL)



















So if   , then the two roots are always real, and if  < , then there are no real roots,
which is what we would expect. These two saddle-node bifurcation points are symmetric around
H = 1
2 for the N = 2 case. However, for the N > 2 case, we would not expect to see this symmetry
due to the form of (6).September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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B Experimental Materials
B.1 ScreenshotVernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory • Purdue University
Page 1
Experiment Overview
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you listen
carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money that will be
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please do not talk or communicate with other participants. Feel free to ask questions by rais-
ing your hand or signaling to the experimenter.
We will ﬁrst go over the instructions, then give a quiz to make sure everyone understands the
instructions. After the quiz, the experiment will begin.
Experiment Details
This experiment consists of 60 rounds. At the beginning of the experiment, everyone is randomly
assigned into groups of 4 people. Your group consists of you and 3 other members. You will remain
in the same group for all 60 rounds.
Speciﬁc Instructions for Each Round
Each round you will be asked to choose one of two options, X and Y . Based on your choice and
the choice of the other members of your group, a group choice will be determined.
Group Choice
The group choice is determined as follows:
• If EVERYONE in your group chooses X, then the group choice is X.
• if ANYONE in your group (including yourself) chooses Y , then the group choice is Y .
• Examples,
– Individual Choices (X,X,X,Y), then the group choice is Y
– Individual Choices (Y,Y,Y,X), then the group choice is Y
– Individual Choices (Y,Y,Y,Y), then the group choice is Y
– Individual Choices (X,X,X,X), then the group choice is X
After each round you will see the “Group Choice” but you will not be able to see the individual
choices of all members of your group.
Payoﬀs
All payoﬀs in the experiment are displayed in $US. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid
in cash. Your payoﬀ at the end of the experiment will be the sum of the payoﬀs for 3 randomly
selected rounds from the 60 total rounds in the experiment.
Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory • Purdue University
Page 2
When making your choice, your payoﬀs will be displayed in a table like the one displayed below.
To make your choice, click the button marked either X or Y . After you have made your choice,
the corresponding row will become highlighted.
In the above example, the person choose X. Once you have made your choice, you will wait for the
other members of your group to make their choice. Once everyone in your group has made their
choice, the group choice column will be highlighted.
Your payoﬀ will be the square that corresponds to your choice and the group choice. In the above
example, the payoﬀ is $2, because “Your Choice” was X and the “Group Choice” was Y .
IMPORTANT:
• Each round the payoﬀs may change, so be sure to look at the payoﬀs each round.
• The payoﬀs may be negative. If you earn negative total proﬁts it will be taken from your
show-up fee.
• After each round, please record “Your Choice,” your “Group Choice” and your “Payoﬀ” for
the round on your record sheet.
Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory • Purdue University
Page 3
Screenshot
• The round number is in the top left.
• The choice table is on the left half of the screen.
– “Your Choice” is represented by the rows.
– The “Group Choice” is represented by the columns.
• The history table is on the right half of the screen. This tells the “Round”, “Your Choice”,
the “Group Choice”, and “Your Payoﬀ” for each round.
• The summary and status are is on the bottom left. This area will tell you:
– When you are waiting for other subjects to make their choice
– After the round is over, what your payoﬀ was in the previous round.
Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory • Purdue University
Page 4
Quiz
To make sure everyone understands the instructions, please answer the following questions.
1. How many rounds are there in the experiment? BLANKBLANK
2. How many people are in your group including yourself? BLANKBLANK
3. Your payoﬀ is determined by the sum of how many randomly selected rounds?BLANKBLANK




5. What is the group choice in the following situations?
• Everyone in your group chooses X. Group Choice: BLANKBLANK
• Everyone in your group chooses Y . Group Choice: BLANKBLANK
• Three people choose Y and one person chooses X. Group Choice: BLANKBLANK
• You choose Y and everyone else chooses X. Group Choice: BLANKBLANK
September 9th, 2011 Julian Romero
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